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Taxing a good results in a loss of economic efficiency whenever it distorts equilibrium behavior away
from the Pareto optimum. To the extent that agents do not notice a tax, the burden of the tax is
exacerbated by the fact that agents cannot adjust the behavior to protect themselves from the tax.
However, the burden of the tax in excess of government revenue, or deadweight loss, is mitigated when
agents do not pay attention to the tax: if consumers pay the tax without noticing it, they are effectively
transferring some of their income to the government in a lump sum. Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009,
henceforth CLK) were the first to make these points. In addition to their theoretical contributions, they
also showed that consumers in the U.S., where sales tax is applied at the register rather than included
on the prices displayed on shelves (or, “sticker prices”), tend to under-react to sales taxes.
While CLK (2009) focuses on the case of homogeneous attention, recent work by Taubinsky and Rees-
Jones (2018, henceforth TRJ) has noted that introducing the possibility of heterogeneous attention may
prevent the computation of deadweight loss from aggregate data. If each person faced a different tax
rate when buying a certain good, understanding welfare effects would require us to study not only ag-
gregate demand, but the demand of every individual. Imposing a high tax on low elasticity individuals
and a low tax on high elasticity individuals would have a very different effect on welfare than doing
the opposite. A similar reasoning applies when all agents face the same tax rate, but perceive different
tax rates. TRJ (2018) find that allowing for heterogeneous attention introduces an issue of allocative
inefficiency that is normally absent from the study of the welfare effects of taxation. In a world of
heterogeneous attention, there is no guarantee that the individuals who end up consuming the good are
the ones who value it the most.
TRJ (2018) make these points in a binary choice model. This is well-suited to their experiment, in
which people are choosing whether or not to buy a certain object, but their proof does not generalize
trivially. Given the predominance of continuous choice settings in much of the literature on tax salience,
including CLK’s seminal paper, this motivates us to study the issue further.
We begin by developing a model of choice under misperceived prices with an arbitrary closed consump-
tion set, and develop our welfare measure: compensating variation due to the tax, net of tax revenue.
Bernheim and Rangel (2009) laid the foundations of welfare analysis with behavioral agents. Our model
is similar to the models of CLK (2007, 2009) and TRJ (2018), but we slightly modify the treatment
of income effects, along the lines of Gabaix’s (2014) model of rational inattention. In the absence of
income effects, our model of choice for an individual agent is essentially equivalent to the model in CLK
(2009), except that we allow for arbitrary consumption sets. Our model is also similar to the model of
Chetty (2009), but for the fact that we specify a particular way in which behavioral agents maximize
utility. While this does not impose severe restrictions on behavior, it offers a useful framework when we
move on to identification. We confirm that some of the major results in CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018)
hold quite broadly: inattention to taxes increases the size of the loss in consumer surplus, but decreases
the size of deadweight loss; attention heterogeneity amplifies deadweight loss, and invalidates CLK’s
sufficient statistic approach.
The main contribution of this paper is to generalize TRJ’s non-identification result to an arbitrary
closed choice set. We show that an econometrician who only observes aggregate consumption data can
only determine the true value of aggregate deadweight loss to lie on an interval. These bounds were













first noted by TRJ (2018) in their proposition A.2. We find these bounds hold generally and propose
to use them as a novel empirical tool.
The lower bound for deadweight loss is the calculation one would perform in the case of a representative
consumer. Since the loss in efficiency is a convex function of the perceived tax rate, the calculation of
deadweight loss from one perceived tax-inclusive price consistent with aggregate demand will generi-
cally underestimate deadweight loss. Heterogeneity in tax salience creates heterogeneity in perceived
net-of-tax prices, which creates an allocative inefficiency across consumers. As the calculation with a
representative consumer only accounts for inefficiency from aggregate foregone consumption due to the
tax, it will under-estimate excess burden. However, in the case in which all agents pay the same amount
of attention to the tax, there is no allocative inefficiency between consumers, and so performing the
calculation as with a representative consumer yields the correct value for deadweight loss. The formula
for this lower bound to deadweight loss is an extension of formulas provided by CLK (2009) and TRJ
(2018).
Following TRJ (2018), we obtain an upper bound for deadweight loss by letting the econometrician
assume that tax salience has support on a known bounded non-negative interval. The upper bound
comes from maximizing perceived price heterogeneity, again exploiting the convexity of deadweight loss
with respect to the perceived tax. This is achieved by positing that agents have either zero or max-
imal salience. Generalizing introduces two additional considerations in calculating the upper bound
for deadweight loss. One, a distribution yielding the upper bound for deadweight loss assigns high
tax salience precisely where it will “hurt” most: to those agents whose particular preferences yield
maximal deadweight loss from that agent relative to the change in consumption of that agent. This
distribution allocates high tax salience to those agents who have more convex demand curves, keeping
the aggregate change in quantity demanded constant. Two, deadweight loss is maximized for a given
aggregate demand if any agent with multiple optimal decisions at the perceived price consumes the
highest amount consistent with their preference when they perceive low prices, whereas they consume
the lowest amount consistent with their preferences when they perceive high prices.1 This is because
heterogeneity in perceived prices permits different equilibria with the same sticker price, tax rate, and
aggregate consumption, yet yielding different values of deadweight loss due to different distributions of
consumption among individuals.
Our approach to compute the upper bound forces the econometrician to impose limits on the possible
values of attention – something that the empirical literature has not settled yet and might be highly
context-dependent. While it might seem natural to assume that attention varies between zero and one,
many papers have found evidence of salience above one – see for instance Allcott and Taubinsky (2015).
In theory, one might allow for unlimited (positive) tax salience, under regularity conditions that avoid
the possibility of unlimited distortion to consumer behavior.2
Our general results follow the work of TRJ (2018), and rely on the fact that the distribution of prefer-
ences is independent of taxes and prices, but that the distribution of salience might change depending
on the value of the tax. Indeed, we show that, even assuming that the distribution of preferences is
entirely known to the econometrician and invariant to observables, one cannot identify deadweight loss.
1TRJ (2018) do not deal with cases like this because they restrict attention to non-atomic distributions of willingness
to pay, so almost every agent has a unique choice that is perceived to maximize utility.
2One might assume that consumer surplus is uniformly bounded to ensure that the upper bound for deadweight loss
is finite even if the upper bound for tax salience is infinite.












2 CHOICE AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS UNDER NON-SALIENT TAXES
We then turn to the special case in which demand is linear in a relevant range where consumption is
positive. This case is of particular interest for three reasons: first, its ease of applicability; second,
its special relationship to the second order approximation of deadweight loss; and third, its illustrative
value in the kind of problems we can face in identifying deadweight loss. In the case of binary choice,
non-identification ultimately comes from the possibility that taxes and attention to taxes are not in-
dependent of each other. Although the experimental evidence in TRJ (2018) suggests that attention
varies with how large the tax is, if one assumed away this possibility we could identify a full distri-
bution of responsiveness to both taxes and sticker prices using existing models of discrete choice with
random coefficients, as in Masten (2017) and Fox (2017). This estimated distribution could then be
used to yield a point-estimate of deadweight loss. In the case of linear demand, instead, even assuming
that attention and taxes are independent would not help identify deadweight loss with aggregate data
beyond the bounds described above.
Our results complement a growing literature on tax salience. Rosen (1976) does not find evidence of
limited tax salience, but besides CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018), Finkelstein (2009), Gallagher and Mueh-
legger (2011), and Goldin and Homonoff (2013) all find strong evidence of dramatically limited tax
salience. Most of this literature looks at sales taxes in the U.S., as they lend themselves very credibly to
a story about lack of salience. However, work on salience has also looked at other settings: Finkelstein
(2009) studies car tolls; Weber and Schram (2016) study whether income taxes being remitted by the
employer or the employee affects differently people’s attitude towards public spending and the burden
of the tax;3 Morone, Nemore and Nuzzo (2018) explore a similar question in the context of a double-
auction market. Blake, Moshary and Tadelis (2017) study how people react differently to back-end and
upfront fees in online purchases; and Bradley and Feldman (2018) study how changes in the disclosure
of ticket taxes affect the demand for airlines. As we mentioned above, most of these empirical papers,
as well as other theoretically focused papers like Goldin (2015), use models where the choice set is
continuous or mixed discrete-continuous.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we develop a general model of choice under misperceived
prices. Once we have replicated some of the major theoretical results in CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018),
we shift focus to identification of deadweight loss. Section 3 lays out the main results of our paper,
establishing the non-identification result and the bounds. Section 4 focuses on the special case in which
demand is linear, and provides a straightforward way to compute our bounds in the context of linear
models. Section 5 concludes. Proofs and other minor results are relegated to the online appendix.
2 Choice and Deadweight Loss under Non-Salient Taxes
This section describes the theoretical model and results that underlie the rest of this paper. Many
of our results here simply mirror previous literature, but we make slightly different modeling choices.
The main modeling challenge in dealing with misperceived prices is to allow for the misperception of
prices while keeping agents financially solvent. CLK (2007, 2009) assume that one good “absorbs” all
optimization mistakes. In contrast our approach, inspired by parts of the model in Gabaix (2014), has
agents conjecture a certain income such that they end up consuming on their true budget constraint
3Interestingly, assuming some agents face credit constraints as in Boadway, Garon, and Perrault (2018), also breaks
traditional optimal tax theory.












2 CHOICE AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS UNDER NON-SALIENT TAXES
when presented with the relative prices they perceive. While this framework preserves all results of
interest from CLK (2009) and TRJ (2018), we find that our approach eases exposition while freeing the
researcher from having to make ad-hoc assumption about which good (or goods) absorb optimization
mistakes. It should be noted that while we do generalize the model to include multiple taxed and
non-taxed goods in the online appendix, in the body of the paper agents will face a choice over two
goods, only one of which is subject to tax.
The agent has a closed consumption set X = XT × R+ ⊆ R2+. She also has a choice function for the
taxed good, q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ), with (p̄, pNT ) ∈ R2++, where p̄ and pNT are respectively the sticker price
of the taxed and non-taxed good, τ ∈ R is the sales tax on the taxed good, and W is the income of the
agent.4 We express taxes as if they were specific, so that p̄ + τ is the tax-inclusive price of the taxed
good.
The agent has a continuous and strictly monotonic utility function u(q, qNT ), where q denotes generic
consumption of the taxed good. The choice vector function q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ) = (q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ), qNT (p̄, pNT , τ,W )) ∈
X meets two requirements. One, the agent spends all available income:5
(p̄+ τ)q(p̄, pNT , τ,W ) + pNT qNT (p̄, pNT , τ,W ) = W. (1)
Two, the agent correctly optimizes in the choice of all consumption bundles when there is no tax:
q(p̄, pNT , 0,W ) ∈ arg max
{p̄∗q+pNT ∗qNT≤W}
u(q, qNT ). (2)
It turns out that this model is quite general, in the sense that it rules out very few possible behaviors.
Indeed, this model is equivalent to one in which agents pick rationally given a perceived price ps, and
conjecture themselves an income W s so that they satisfy their true budget constraint at their perceived
price. Proposition 2 and subsequent work in the online appendix shows that, under weak convexity
assumptions on preferences, one can find a pair (ps,W s) to satisfy equations 1 and 2 for any choice
function q(·).
We now want some measure of the incidence of the tax on the consumer. For concreteness, we consider
the compensating variation due to the tax with complete pass-through, defined as:
∆CS ≡ inf{∆W | u(q(p̄, pNT , τ,W + ∆W )) ≥ u(q(p̄, pNT , 0,W ))}.
4We implicitly restrict consideration to sticker prices, taxes, and income such that q(p̄, τ,W ) is well-defined at those
values.
5When we consider multiple non-taxed goods in the online appendix, we also have agents optimally choose qNT given
their choice of q.























Figure 1: Welfare effects from the imposition of a non-salient tax.
In words, the change in consumer surplus is the greatest lower bound of the amount of money the agent
requires to achieve the utility reached before the imposition of the tax. Online appendix proposition 3
shows that the change in consumer surplus can be written as the sum of what consumer would have
to be compensated if the tax-inclusive price were actually ps and the income they “lost” due to their
inattention:
∆CS = (p̄+ τ − ps)h(ps)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income lost
+ e(ps)− e(p̄)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆CS under ps
. (3)
This representation, which is graphically illustrated in figure 1, readily gives us two interesting results.
First, as noted by CLK (2007, 2009), if ps ∈ [p̄, p̄+ τ ], then the consumer will be worse off than if she
paid attention to the tax:















Second, a consumer can be made better off by an increase in the tax, which we do not believe previ-
ous literature to have noted. This is because a tax increase can induce inattentive agents to reduce
their consumption of the taxed good to zero, improving welfare for consumers who would have already
avoided consuming the taxed good had they been attentive to the tax.6 We provide a graphical example
6More formally, consumption does not necessarily have to be reduced to zero for the consumer to be made better off.
The loss of consumer surplus decreases in τ whenever the tax is sufficiently high such that consumption is sufficiently



























(b) Under τ2 the consumer loses exactly total CS
Figure 2: The consumer in (a) is worse off than in (b), although she is subject to a lower tax
To obtain deadweight loss, we need to adjust ∆CS for the change in tax revenue:7
dwl ≡ ∆CS − τq(p̄, pNT , τ,W + ∆CS) = e(ps)− e(p̄)− (ps − p̄)q(p̄, pNT ,W + ∆CS). (4)
Note that deadweight loss is exactly as if the agent was correct that the tax-inclusive price were ps.
To introduce heterogeneity, let i ∈ I index consumers. Each consumer is characterized by her perception
of the price of the taxed good, psi , type, θi, standing in for her preferences θi and income Wθi , and
tie-breaking parameter ζi, which we need for technical reasons.
8 These consumer-specific parameters
are distributed according to F ∗ps,θ,ζ . Each agent has a choice function for the taxed good, satisfying:




i ; θi, ζi) ∈ {q|∃qNT : (q, qNT ) θi q′ ∀q′ ∈ X : (psi , pNT ) ∗ q′ ≤W si },
where psi and W
s
i are determined as in the model of section 2, with corresponding expenditure function





[e(psi ; θi)− e(p̄; θi)]− (psi − p̄)q(psi ; θi)dF ∗ps,θ(psi , θi).
small (but positive).
7We maintain the convention that deadweight loss is a generically positive value.
8ζi acts as a tie-breaker among bundles that could all have been chosen: choices do not necessarily reflect true
preferences when agents misperceive prices, and agents might appear indifferent between choices that do not actually
yield the same ex-post utility. This is in sharp contrast with the neo-classical model, where the actual choice that one
selects among indifferent bundles has no impact on consumer surplus. But in this model of choice, different values of
conjectured income might yield different choices, even given the same preferences, perceived prices, and true income.












3 NON-IDENTIFICATION WITH AGGREGATE DATA
This paper emphasizes continuous choice, as the binary choice case is worked out in TRJ (2018). We
momentarily assume that h is continuously differentiable with respect to its own price, and that ps is




In line with existing deadweight loss analyses, we can consider a second-order approximation, letting











i , θi). (5)
This process of aggregation makes apparent two important points that confirm the analysis of TRJ
(2018) extends naturally to continuous choice. First, allowing for attention heterogeneity introduces an
issue of allocative inefficiency, as it is no longer guaranteed that consumers who value some units of the
taxed good the most will be the ones who end up purchasing those units. It should be noted that we are
assuming throughout this paper that supply is perfectly elastic, and so tax increases will be reflected
one-for-one in the after-tax price. This is not really an issue of concern: as TRJ (2018) note, all that
is needed to generalize this to an arbitrary supply function is to account for the change in sticker price
and the change in profits to suppliers. Nonetheless, as in TRJ’s work, it is interesting to deviate for a
moment from this assumption, to consider what happens to aggregate deadweight loss when supply is























and DWL = 0 when attention is homogeneous, i.e. mi = m ∀i. Thus, a non-salient tax may yield
excess burden even without changing the equilibrium quantity, due to its effects on allocative efficiency.



















are sufficient statistics for the deadweight loss in equation 5. These points effectively extend some of
TRJ’s (2018) major results to continuous choice. In the next section, we formalize this non-identification
result with an arbitrary choice function, and show how one might bound deadweight loss with mere
information on aggregate parameters.
3 Non-Identification with Aggregate Data
This section discusses to what degree one can infer deadweight loss from aggregate choice data. Our
results generalize TRJ’s work on binary choice to an arbitrary choice set. We find this to be of interest for
two reasons. First, many papers dealing with tax salience, including the seminal paper by CLK (2009),
operate in a continuous choice setting. Second, while point identification is impossible using aggregate
9Formally, the claim is that there exist (ps,W s) such that ∂p
s
∂τ
, where the derivative is taken while the consumer is
being compensated, is well defined. If ∂h
∂p















= 0 in a neighborhood around p̄, then set ∂p
s
∂τ


















3 NON-IDENTIFICATION WITH AGGREGATE DATA
parameters, we can still provide tight bounds based solely on aggregate (or average) quantities.
For simplicity, we assume that the econometrician already knows the distribution of preference types,
but this should not be considered a limiting assumption. Consumer preferences can be identified with
sticker price variation when there are no (non-salient) taxes. Regardless, even when the econometrician
can fully observe the true distribution of preferences, and how much aggregate consumption there is at
every tax level, she still cannot infer the exact value of deadweight loss. However, we provide a lower
bound and an upper bound for deadweight loss. The lower bound is achieved by assuming that all
agents perceive the same tax-inclusive price, i.e. assume there is no attention heterogeneity. The upper
bound for deadweight loss is achieved by imposing maximal attention heterogeneity. Since the data
do not reveal the individual variation in tax salience, one cannot point identify deadweight loss from
aggregate data. Deadweight loss can take on any value between the upper and lower bounds.10
The results in this section are described as if all agents face the same sales tax. Also, since we are
considering the problem of identification with aggregate demand, we assume there are no income effects.
This is because even the standard model with fully salient taxes requires strong restrictions on income
effects in order to achieve identification with aggregate data, as the same income can yield different
consumption bundles whenever there are several conjectured incomes that solve the agent’s problem.
Suppressing income and price for the non-taxed good, we denote the consumption function for agent
i with type θi and perceived tax-inclusive price p
s
i for the taxed good by q(p
s
i ; θi, ζi). However, all of
these results follow if one reinterprets q(psi ; θi, ζi) as the compensated choice of agent i.
To ensure integrability, we assume the econometrician knows that F ∗ps has support with lower bound
greater than zero, and so only considers marginal distributions of subjective prices bounded above zero.
The econometrician observes aggregate demand:∫
psi ,θi,ζi




i , θi, ζi).
Deadweight loss for an individual i is a function of their expenditure function e(p) and prices via:
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi) = e(p
s
i ; θi)− e(p̄; θi)− (psi − p̄)q(psi ; θi, ζi).








i , θi, ζi).
The problem of identification is to find conditions for which any joint distribution Fps,θ,ζ of (p
s, θ, ζ),
as a function of observable variables p̄ & τ , satisfying these conditions and such that aggregate demand
is rationalized; that is, such that for any observed values of observable variables, any F satisfying∫
psi ,θiζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζi(p
s
i , θi, ζi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi




i , θi, ζi), (6)
10This claim follows by taking any weighted average of the distributions of parameters yielding upper and lower bounds
of deadweight loss.












3.1 Lower Bound on Deadweight Loss 3 NON-IDENTIFICATION WITH AGGREGATE DATA
also yields the same value for deadweight loss:∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) = DWL.
The main message of this section will be the failure of such a result obtaining. We show that there
are at least two distributions satisfying 6 that yield different values of DWL. These two distributions
also turn out to yield tight bounds to the possible values of DWL that are consistent with aggregate
demand.
Finally, we impose regularity conditions throughout this section to rule out ill-defined integrals. For-
mally, we insist that the econometrician only consider distributions that satisfy the integrability condi-
tions, described below.
Definition 1. A distribution Fps,θ,ζ satisfies the integrability conditions if:
1. q and dwl are integrable on any measurable set.
2. q(p; θi, z) is integrable on any subset of the support of θ for any p > 0 and any z in the range of
ζ.
For instance, all distributions with a finite support of (ps, θ, ζ) satisfy the above conditions.
3.1 Lower Bound on Deadweight Loss
Consider arbitrary p̄, pNT , and τ . For arbitrary Fps,θ,ζ consistent with the data, we can choose a price
p̂s that could also rationalize the data if perceived homogeneously.
Proposition 1. For any Fps,θ,ζ that yields integrable aggregate demand, there exists p̂
s such that for




q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s






We can always rationalize the data with a joint distribution of (ps, θ) in which θ has marginal distribution
F ∗θ , whereas p
s = p̂s with probability one. We now show that such a joint distribution provides a generic
underestimate to the possible values of deadweight loss.
Theorem 1. Consider any joint distributions Fps,θ,ζ and Fθ,ζ with corresponding value p̂
s such that:∫
θ,ζ
q(p̂s; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi) =
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
Then the following inequality obtains:∫
θi,ζi
dwl(p̂s; θi, ζi)dFθ,ζ(θi, ζi) ≤
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
Intuitively, introducing heterogeneity in perceived prices can mute gains from trade. If someone with a
higher marginal valuation for the good has a higher perceived price than someone with a lower marginal












3.2 Upper bound on deadweight loss 3 NON-IDENTIFICATION WITH AGGREGATE DATA
valuation, they could both gain by trading with each other after making their consumption decisions.
If they could exchange with each other, the one who perceived the higher price could purchase some
of the good from the other agent, making both agents better off. Thus, ruling out perceived price
heterogeneity by assuming a homogeneous perceived price p̂s eliminates the possibility of an allocative
















(b) Low perceived price
Figure 3: A graphical illustration of Theorem 1. When one picks p̂s as to make the change in demand
equal for the consumer in (a) and in (b), the decrease in dwl for the consumer in (a) (orange) must be
at least as large as the increase in dwl for the consumer in (b) (green).
Theorem 1 points out that for any distribution that rationalizes the data, i.e. that explains the observed
aggregate demand, one can alternatively rationalize the data with a homogeneous perceived price that
yields (weakly) less deadweight loss. From this, we can reach two conclusions. One, we generally cannot
identify deadweight loss because we could always alternatively rationalize the data with a homogeneous
perceived price.11 This holds even if we already knew the distribution of preference types F ∗θ . Two, if
there is a minimum value of deadweight loss that is consistent with the data, that value of deadweight
loss comes from a distribution with no heterogeneity in tax salience.
3.2 Upper bound on deadweight loss
The upper bound comes from an assumption on the limits to tax salience:
Assumption 1. There is some value m̄ ≥ 0 such that ps has support known to be contained in P ≡
[p̄, p̄+ m̄τ ].
This assumption says that agents must perceive a non-negative tax τs no greater than fraction m̄ of the
true tax.12 The econometrician is allowed to assume an arbitrarily large m̄, but the gain in robustness
will likely come at the expense of precision. For instance, setting m̄ = 1 would be to assume that
11This claim holds generically, but would not hold, for instance, if there was no heterogeneity in tax salience.
12This description implicitly assumes that τ > 0.












3.2 Upper bound on deadweight loss 3 NON-IDENTIFICATION WITH AGGREGATE DATA
agents never over-react to a tax rate. Imposing that τs ≥ 0 with probability one already ensures that
deadweight loss is no greater than the original consumer surplus.13 But the interval restriction implies
any distribution yields no more deadweight loss than a distribution with “binary” perceived prices, i.e.
where ps can only take on values in {p̄, p̄+ m̄τ} ≡ ∂P.
The gist of the upper bound of deadweight loss is that, for any data-generating process that rationalizes
observed aggregate demand, there is another data-generating process that also rationalizes observed
demand, but which would yield at least as much deadweight loss. This alternative explanation of the
observed demand insists that all agents pay either zero or maximal attention.
Before formally stating our main result, we demonstrate how one can always pick such a distribution
of attention to rationalize observed demand, for any underlying (known) distribution of preferences.
Then, we state the main result, theorem 2, providing some intuition for why such a distribution would
yield a weakly higher deadweight loss. Because our model of choice may result in several choices given
the same sticker prices and taxes, sometimes there can be multiple equilibria with the same level of
aggregate demand, but different consequences for welfare. We briefly discuss appendix theorem 3, which
deals deals with such cases.
Consider any Fps,θ,ζ that rationalizes the data, and such that:
lim
m→m̄−
Fps(p̄+mτ)− Fps(p̄) > 0.
In words, the distribution assumes some positive mass of agents pay neither zero nor maximal attention,
i.e. m ∈ (p̄, p̄ + m̄τ) ≡ int(P). Pick p̃s ∈ int(P) and a corresponding pb(psi ) ≡ p̄ + I(psi > p̃s)m̄τ such
that: ∫
psi∈int(P),θi
q(pb(psi ); θi, l)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi) ≤
∫
psi∈int(P),θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s




q(pb(psi ); θi, h)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi).
In words, for any distribution that puts mass on int(P), we pick a value p̃s that acts as a divide: those
below it get assigned to a group that does not perceive the tax at all, while those above it get assigned
to a group that perceives it “maximally”. Since demand is monotonic in p, and given our definitions
of l and h, one can always pick p̃s such that the above inequalities hold weakly. Thus, one can always




q(pb(psi ); θi, h)dFps,θ(p
s
i , θi) + (1− λ)
∫
psi∈intP,θi
q(pb(psi ); θi, l)dFps,θ(p
s




q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
Equation 7 implies that we can always pick a threshold p̃s that rationalizes demand, so long as we
randomly assign a fraction λ of consumers with m ∈ int(P) to the tie-breaking parameter ζ = h, and
the remaining 1−λ to ζ = l. But in turn, this implies that we have found binary distribution of ps and
13Recall that deadweight loss equals its calculation as if taxes actually satisfied τi = p
s
i − p̄, so excess burden cannot
exceed the original consumer surplus for any agent. One can show that if τs has support on negative values, then it’s
possible to have total deadweight loss substantially greater than the original total consumer surplus.












3.2 Upper bound on deadweight loss 3 NON-IDENTIFICATION WITH AGGREGATE DATA
ζ that rationalizes aggregate demand.
Let us call such distribution F ′′ps,θ,ζ . This new distribution has the same marginal distribution of
preferences, Fθ = F
′′
θ . If a consumer perceived a price in the boundary region in the original distribution
Fps,θ,ζ , then so will she in the new distribution: F
′′
ps,θ,ζ|ps∈∂P = Fps,θ,ζ|ps∈∂P . As for those consumers
who perceived a price in the interior, we propose to split them up in a manner akin to what we just did
in equation 7: F ′′pb(ps),θ = Fps,θ, and ζ is assigned randomly as we described above. One can quickly
confirm that this distribution rationalizes the same demand as the original distribution Fps,θ,ζ :∫
psi ,θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi) =
∫
psi∈int(P),θi,ζi
q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s




q(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s




















i , θi, ζi).
Furthermore, such a distribution provides a generically larger value of deadweight loss than does Fps,θ,ζ .
Theorem 2. Under assumption 1, for any Fps,θ,ζ and any corresponding F
′′
ps,θ,ζ as described above:∫
psi ,θi,ζi




i , θi, ζi) ≥
∫
psi ,θi,ζi
dwl(psi ; θi, ζi)dFps,θ,ζ(p
s
i , θi, ζi).
We can obtain intuition in two ways. One is to note that the method of forcing binary perceived prices
increases heterogeneity of perceived prices compared to Fps,θ,ζ . Another is by considering the case
where m̄ = 1 and F ∗θ is known to be degenerate, so that all agents have the same preferences. For
a given aggregate demand, deadweight loss is maximized under these preferences when some perceive
price psi = p̄, while others correctly perceived the true tax rate p
s
i = p̄ + τ . This is because for each
individual agent, deadweight loss is convex in the perceived price. Hence, for a given aggregate demand,
aggregate deadweight loss will be highest when it is as high as possible for some – namely, those who
fully perceive the tax – while it is null for everybody else – as those who don’t perceive the tax at all
are effectively subject to a lump-sum tax. We provide a graphical illustration of this argument in figure 4.






























(b) Low perceived price
Figure 4: A graphical illustration of Theorem 2. The watershed price p̃s is chosen to make the change
in demand equal for the consumer in (a) and in (b). As long as we are dealing with weakly decreasing
demand functions, the increase in deadweight loss for (a) is at least as big as the green box, while the
decrease in deadweight loss for (b) is at most as big as the orange box. By assigning a perceived price
of p̄+ m̄τ to the consumer in (a) and p̄ to the consumer in (b), we have increased aggregate deadweight
loss holding aggregate demand constant.
Theorem 2 illustrates that for any distribution of (ps, θ) that rationalizes the data, we can alternatively
rationalize the data with a distribution with support for psi on {p̄, p̄+ m̄τ} that yields (weakly) greater
deadweight loss. Again, we see that identification of deadweight loss is not generally possible even if
we knew the distribution of F ∗θ , as different marginal distributions of p
s and ζ could have different
implications for deadweight loss. Also, any upper bound to the possible values of deadweight loss must
be generated from a distribution with support of perceived prices on {p̄, p̄+ m̄τ}.
However, not all distributions that have ps ∈ ∂P with probability one yield the same value of dead-
weight loss, even when rationalizing the same data with the same distribution of preference types. The
allocation of the good that yields the highest possible deadweight loss will also assign more consump-
tion to agents with more convex demand curves. Theorem 3 in the online appendix spells out how to
assign consumption of the good in the way it will “do the least good”, and deals with cases where the
tie-breaking parameter ζ is relevant, to get a general expression for the upper bound for deadweight
loss consistent with aggregate demand and the distribution of preferences.
4 Linear Special Case
In this section, we discuss the special case in which q is known to be linear in p̄ and τ (for fixed pNT ). We
focus on this example both because of how frequently economists estimate linear models and because
of its relationship to the second order approximation of deadweight loss.
We can also use the linear special case to better illustrate the general identification problem. In
this subsection, we will no longer assume that the distribution of preference parameters is known;
the econometrician will, as is usually the case, be able to identify preferences with exogenous price












4 LINEAR SPECIAL CASE
variation. As in TRJ (2018), we assume the distribution of preferences does not depend on taxes (or
prices). Further, we permit the econometrician to assume that the distribution of tax salience does
not change as sticker prices and taxes vary. This entirely rules out any sort of endogeneity between
attention and taxes – which was driving non-identification in the binary case – and yet we will get the
same non-identification result.
Naturally, no demand curve can be entirely linear, for the simple reason that agents cannot consume
negative quantities. But in practice, one rarely gets the privilege of such rich variation in prices when
doing empirical work. What we are implicitly assuming in this section is that the values of (p̄, τ) that
are considered are all such that p̄ > 0, and qi > 0 for all consumers in the market, so that aggregate
demand is also linear at those values. In other words, one can think of our work here as modeling linear
demand conditional on buying at all prices under consideration.14
We might recall from section 2 that one can express a second order approximation to deadweight loss
as a function of derivatives. If the choice function is linear in regressors p̄ and τ , the second order
approximation is an exact calculation of deadweight loss, and our results from the previous sections
apply.
Formally, each preference type θi takes the form θi = (βi, εi) ∈ R2.15 To maintain linearity in regressors,
we also assume that tax salience m is constant with respect to τ . The choice function q then takes the
form:
qi = α+ βip
s
i + εi = α+ βi[p̄+miτ ] + εi
We are suppressing the tie-breaking parameter ζ because in this linear example θi,mi, p̄, and τ always
uniquely determine consumption. We have the parameter α so that we can assume without loss of
generality that E[ε] = 0.
Defining β̃i ≡ miβi yields:
qi = α+ βip̄+ β̃iτ + εi, (8)


























We assume that not just the distribution of preference parameters, but also the joint distribution of pref-
erence and salience parameters remains unaffected by the specific values of p̄ and τ . The econometrician
14We thank an anonymous referee at the Journal of Public Economic Theory for helping us clarify our thinking on this
matter.
15Agents have quasi-linear utility ui =
q2i /2−(α+εi)qi
ii
+ qNTi . For a given p




+ pNT qNTi .












4 LINEAR SPECIAL CASE
observes for various values of regressors:
E[q|p̄, τ ] ≡
∫
βi,β̃i,εi
[α+ βip̄+ β̃iτ + εi]dF
∗
β,β̃,ε
(βi, β̃i, εi) = α+ E[β]p̄+ E[β̃]τ. (9)
where F ∗
β,β̃,ε
is the true distribution of (β,mβ, ε). The challenge is to use the observed values of triplets
(p̄, τ, E[q|p̄, τ ]) to infer aggregate deadweight loss, which in this case is equivalent to its second order











The only restriction that the econometrician imposes on the distribution of tax salience m is that the
support of tax salience is contained within the interval [0, m̄]. The econometrician can also use the
Compensated Law of Demand as defined in appendix lemma 2, which shows that compensated demand
is always weakly decreasing, so that P[β ≤ 0] = 1. In fact, we can permit the econometrician to know
the entire distribution of θ = (β, ε). It will not affect our results.} First, we can find a homogeneous
perceived price that rationalizes the data for any τ . In particular, a linear regression of aggregate
demand on sticker prices and taxes may permit identification of β̂ ≡ E[β] and ˆ̃β ≡ E[β̃], respectively.16






Then the homogeneous perceived price that rationalizes the data is p̂s = p̄+ m̂τ . To see this, note that
















= α+ β̂p̄+ m̂
ˆ̃
βτ
= α+ β̂ p̄+
ˆ̃
β τ.
Thus, the econometrician cannot rule out all agents perceiving the same price p̂s, and so cannot rule







By theorem 1, this is a lower bound for deadweight loss.
Alternatively, the econometrician cannot rule out the perceived tax τs having support in {0, m̄τ}. To
see this, consider P(ps = p̄+ m̄τ) = m̂m̄ and P(p
s = p̄) = 1− m̂m̄ independently of other parameters and
16Such identification requires exogenous and non-collinear variation in sticker prices and taxes. If the econometrician
cannot identify these terms, so much the worse for identifying aggregate deadweight loss.
17If β̂ = 0, then let m̂ = 0.
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dFβ,ε(βi, β̃i, εi) = α+ E[β]p̄+ m̂E[β]τ = α+ E[β]p̄+ E[β̃]τ.













For instance, if m̄ = 1, then the value of deadweight loss under a homogeneous perceived price is fraction
m̂ of the above calculation of deadweight loss.
Proceeding from theorem 2, we noted that there is a specific distribution of perceived prices on {p̄, p̄+
m̄τ} that maximizes deadweight loss. We describe that distribution in theorem 3, noting that it involves
assigning high or low perceived prices based on the ratio of per-person deadweight loss to the change







Thus, the distribution of tax salience independent of all other parameters and regressors in which
P(m = m̄) = m̂m̄ and P(m = 0) = 1−
m̂
m̄ maximizes deadweight loss. More generally, the econometrician
cannot rule out this maximal value of deadweight loss so long as they cannot rule out the possibility of
some distribution F with Fβ = F
∗
β such that supp(m) ∈ {0, m̄} with:
PF (m = m̄)EF [β̃|m = m̄] = m̂β̂ = ˆ̃β.
One can check that this distribution rationalizes the data,
E[q|p̄, τ ] = α+ E[β]p̄+ EF [β̃]τ = α+ β̂p̄+ PF [m = m̄]EF [β̃|m = m̄]τ = α+ β̂p̄+ ˆ̃βτ,
and yields the maximal value of deadweight loss,
−1
2
EF [m2β]τ2 = −
1
2






More intuitively, once one knows β̂ and
ˆ̃
β, one can rationalize the aggregate data. Since the ratio
of deadweight loss to the change in quantity is constant, the relationship between tax salience and
preferences doesn’t matter upon attaining the observed aggregate demand.
Finally, consider a distribution with m ⊥ (β, ε) with supp(m) ⊆ {0, m̂, m̄}, P(m = m̂) = λ and














18In the true distribution, it must be that m̂ ∈ [0, m̄]. Alternatively, one could consider checking whether m̂ ∈ [0, m̄] as
a weak test of the null hypothesis that tax salience is bounded within that interval.













We can conclude from this result that one cannot even identify a second order approximation of dead-
weight loss with aggregate data alone.19 Imposing structure on preferences to facilitate identification of
F ∗θ still only permits interval identification. Nonetheless, we can use aggregate data to obtain bounds,
or at least m̂, which gives us a sense of the uncertainty over the possible values of deadweight loss.
Besides its illustrative value, this linear framework also gives researchers a quick and easy way to com-
pute bounds for the deadweight loss of non-salient taxes or fees in a variety of empirical contexts. In
the online appendix, we apply these findings to the framework of CLK’s study of aggregate beer con-
sumption and Goldin and Homonoff’s (2013) study of cigarette consumption. Details on the estimation
procedures are provided in the online appendix. In the baseline specification of the CLK (2009) data,
we estimate that m̂ ≈ 0.31. This estimate suggests that even assuming that salience cannot exceed one,
m̄ = 1, the upper bound of deadweight loss is about three times the lower bound. These estimates,
however, all seem fairly imprecise. Across the two data-sets, there is no specification in which we can
reject the null hypothesis that m̂ = 0, permitting the upper bound to be arbitrarily large in proportion
to the lower bound.20 Similarly, in most specifications we cannot reject that m̂ = 1, which would imply
that upper bound and lower bound are identical. This underlying uncertainty is mirrored in previous
work on tax salience – e.g., TRJ (2018) find that individual differences increase excess burden by at
least 200% relative to the case of homogeneous attention – but our wide confidence intervals may be
the result of the specific data sets we are using here – for example, Goldin and Homonoff (2013) often
cannot reject that consumers do not react at all to sales taxes. Our procedure, however, seems so
straightforward to carry out that it might turn out useful in future research on tax salience.
Finally, in both the setting of CLK (2009) and Goldin and Homonoff (2013), functional form assumptions
seem to matter. The limitations of the linear setting would prompt us to undergo more sophisticated
and less parametric exercises, but we are dissuaded by the fact that our statistical power is already very
low.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied deadweight loss in a model where agents misperceive prices. We started by
generalizing the theoretical results of CLK (2007, 2009) with an arbitrary closed choice set. Inattentive-
ness to taxes makes agents worse off while reducing deadweight loss by preventing agents from avoiding
the tax.
As in the binary choice model of TRJ (2018), heterogeneous attention adds another layer of complex-
ity to deadweight loss. In our general setting, we show that aggregate consumption can be consistent
with a wide variety of co-distributions of attention and preferences, each with a different implication
for deadweight loss. This is because it matters who gets the good and who doesn’t: when prices are
misperceived, there is no guarantee that agents who end up with some units of the good are the ones
who value those units most. By minimizing and maximizing this allocative inefficiency, we show that
deadweight loss can only vary between two extremes for any given aggregate demand. The lower bound
holds generally, while the upper bound relies on the assumption that tax salience has support contained






, so that as m̂ approaches zero from above, this ratio of upper to lower bounds blows up to
infinity.













in a known non-negative interval.
Finally, we explore the special case in which demand is linear, which is of special interest due to its
relationship to both the empirical literature and the second order approximation of deadweight loss.
Our analysis shows that, while identification of deadweight loss under binary choice may be restated as
an endogeneity problem, the same cannot be said regardless of the choice set. Indeed, when individual
demand is linear, assuming independence of tax salience from taxes and prices does not change the
interval of possible values of deadweight loss.
The linear model yields bounds for deadweight loss that one can easily compute from linear regression
estimates. While this doesn’t necessarily doom any future application in empirical work, our own ap-
plications of this method on the existing work of CLK (2009) and Goldin and Homonoff (2013) leave
us without many answers about how tight these bounds might be. While some point estimates seem
reasonable, they also can be imprecise and dependent on functional form specification.
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